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Introduction 
Traditional agency theory represents the overwhelmingly dominant theoretical 
approach applied in corporate governance research (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 
1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Krause and Bruton, 2014). 
By starting from the assumption that the separation between ownership and control 
may lead to managers maximizing their own interests at the expenses of shareholders 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Benston, 1985), agency theory provides an explanation of 
how firms could exist, assuming that all managers are self-interested and they do not 
take decisions that are in line with shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Although agency theory dominates the corporate governance literature (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Certo et al., 2006), a growing number of scholars have started to 
look more critically at the assumptions of agency theory (Daily, et al., 2003; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003; Johnson, et al., 1996, Roberts et al., 2005). Due to the weak and 
ambiguous results obtained by applying agency theory, many scholars (Connelly et 
al., 1980; Hung, 1998; Child and Rodrigues, 2003; Daily et al., 2003; Allcock and 
Filatotchev, 2010; Ahrens et al., 2011; Dalziel et al., 2011) have been encouraged to 
seek out new models and theories, which go beyond agency theory.  
This paper is a response to the call for more in-depth studies into the multiple 
agency theory (Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2011; 
Hoskisson et al., 2013). Several scholars argue that it is fundamental to adopt a 
pluralistic approach to better understand corporate governance practices (Hung, 1998; 
Daily et al., 2003; Allcock and Filatotchev, 2010; van Ees at al., 2009; Roberts et al., 
2005; Hendry, 2005; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). Multiple agency theory is based on a 
pluralistic approach in which different existing theories are combined with basic 
agency theory to better understand and explain the complexity of corporate 
governance. The essential idea is that none of the theories can independently fully 
explain reality (Hung, 1998).  
Theoretical pluralism allows for the building of a broader view of corporate 
governance practices, since it provides “complementary perspectives” (van Ees et al., 
2009, p. 311). However, not all scholars explicitly use the label of this multiple 
theoretical approach. For instance, Hung (1998) does not provide a specific title for 
his pluralistic framework, although he recognizes the need for reconciling agency 
theory with other theoretical approaches. Daily et al. (2003) and Huse et al. (2011) do 
not put a particular label on their approach. However, they believe that a multi-
theoretical framework is fundamental for understanding and analysing corporate 
governance mechanisms and processes. They call for a reconceptualization of 
corporate governance theory.  
 Earlier multiple agency studies have analysed differences in the motives of 
executives and venture capitalists (Arthurs et al., 2008), the different motives of 
professional funds and pension funds (Hoskisson et al., 2002), the effects of the 
compensation schemes awarded to independents and CEOs on firm-level risk taking 
(Deutsch et al., 2011), performance effects due to the relationship between ownership 
concentration and private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in 
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IPO (Bruton et al., 2010); and the effects of family ownership on private information 
abuses and the firm’s performance in emerging markets (Filatotchev et al., 2011). 
However, there is no attempt to better clarify multiple agency theory and its insights 
in a comprehensive way by taking into consideration the broad processes and on the 
other hand, many scholars (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Huse 
et al., 2011; Westphal and Zajac, 2013; Armstrong et al., 2014) call for a more 
complex but realistic perspective of independent directors. For this reason, we 
develop propositions for future research by applying the four theories discussed in the 
previous section applied to the five fundaments of multiple agency theory, i.e. (1) 
many-to-many relationships between all kinds of stakeholders; (2) dual identities; (3) 
dilemmas; (4) complementarities and cooperative behaviour; and (5) context creating 
governance diversity. 
Consequently, the first aim of this paper is to analyse the five fundaments of 
multiple agency theory which is based on a review of the existing literature on 
multiple agency theory. Consequently, the first aim of this paper is to reconcile four 
corporate theories in order to better understand the five key fundaments of multiple 
agency theory The second aim is to illustrate how a comprehensive approach which 
reconciles agency theory with four other theories is able to develop a better 
understanding of the role and functioning of independent directors leading to 
propositions for future research.   
In the first section of this paper, we analyse the five fundaments of multiple 
agency theory which are found across the literature. In the second section, we present 
a review of four theories, in order to deeply understand the fundaments of multiple 
agency theory. In the third section, we apply the key elements of the multiple agency 
theory and develop some theoretically based propositions coming from the 
combinations of these four theories to illustrate how a multiple agency approach 
allows better understanding of independent directors. The last section concludes. 
 
Key Elements of Multiple Agency Theory 
A growing number of scholars agree that an alternative theoretical framework 
is needed to effectively understand the reality of corporate governance and board 
practices (Hung, 1998; Daily et al., 2003; Allcock and Filatotchev, 2010; van Ees at 
al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2005; Hendry, 2005; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). Even though 
not all scholars have chosen the same label to define the alternative approach, we 
claim that one of the best ways to define it is, ‘multiple agency theory’ (Arthurs at al., 
2008; Bruton et al., 2010; Deutsch et al., 2011; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Hoskisson et 
al., 2013). The word ‘multiple’ refers to a pluralistic approach, i.e. a theoretical 
framework that aims to better understand board practices by combining principles and 
insights stemming from several approaches. ‘Agency theory’ refers to the use of the 
agency theory as the starting point. Agency theory should not be totally abandoned 
(Hung, 1998) because it provides a distinctive and “empirically testable perspective 
on problems of cooperative effects (Eisenhardt, 1989: 72).” It means that agency 
theory constitutes the foundation of the ‘building’ we want to construct (i.e. multiple 
agency theory) and all other theories represent bricks of the new theoretical 
framework. It follows that it is fundamental to review those bricks from other 
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theoretical approaches. However, before describing the multiple theories that we 
would like to put forward as elements of the multiple agency theory, it is necessary to 
explain first its fundaments. 
Therefore, in this section, we outline the key elements of Multiple Agency 
Theory: (1) many-to-many relationships between all kinds of stakeholders; (2) dual 
identities; (3) dilemmas; (4) complementarities and cooperative behaviour; and (5) 
context creating governance diversity.  
 
Many-to-many relationships between all kinds of stakeholders  
According to agency theory, a firm is considered as a ‘nexus of contracts’ 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937) rather than as a ‘nexus of relationships’ 
(Fichman and Levinthal, 1991). This means that a firm is embedded in a multiple and 
heterogeneous network of relationships among all kinds of stakeholders who are able 
to, directly and indirectly, influence the firm (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). It follows 
that many-to-many relationships rather than one-to-one relationships, are one of the 
key elements in multiple agency theory (Hung, 1998; Arthurs et al., 2008; Hoskisson 
et al., 2013). Moreover, multiple agency theory regards many-to-many relationships 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002, 2013) among constituencies who are not only shareholders, 
the board of directors and management, but also many other stakeholders who have 
an impact on the firm (Freeman, 1984, 2010; Freeman et al., 2004; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995).  
Dual identities of contracting parties  
It follows that multiple agency theory is based on the idea that there are not 
only conflicts of interest between one agent and one principal – as agency theory 
deems – but also among principals and among agents (Hoskisson et al., 2002; 
Filatotchev and Allcock, 2013). Multiple agency theory studies the dual identities of 
contracting parties as an inherent characteristic of corporate governance (Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000). This means that some agents serve multiple principals (for example, 
an independent director serving on several boards at the same time), the latter could 
have multiple agents (for example, one reference shareholder can have several 
representatives on the board), and some actors could be both principal and agent at the 
same time (for instance, a shareholder of one company could be at the same time a 
director or manager in another company) (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Mizruchi (1996) 
refers in this respect to interlocking directors.  
Dilemmas 
Multiple agency theory extends the agency theory setting in terms of the 
traditional principal-agent conflict by considering also the potential conflicts or 
tensions an actor could encounter or experience that result from his or her dual 
identity. Indeed, multiple agency theory recognizes that, unlike the traditional agency 
approach, principals/agents could implement actions which are favourable to one 
agent/principal, but at the same time detrimental to others (Ingley et al., 2012; 
Hoskinsson et al., 2013). In other words, multiple agency theory recognises that 
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corporate governance is mainly about dilemmas. A board could propose to increase 
the bonuses, which fits perfectly the interests of management. However, this 
proposition could, at the same time, be in contradiction with the interests of the 
shareholders who might be interested in a higher dividend. 
Complementarities and cooperative behaviour  
Multiple agency theory also recognizes that corporate governance is not only 
about conflicts and conflicting behaviour. On the contrary, complementarities and 
opportunities for cooperation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994) between principals and agents and amongst principals and agents can exist 
along with conflicts (Hoskisson et al., 2009). It is important to point out that it is in 
sharp contrast with traditional agency theory assumption to consider behaviour as 
cooperative rather than conflictual (Allcock and Filatotchev, 2010; Deutsh et al., 
2011; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Hoskisson et al., 2009; 2013; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). For example, it is perfectly possible and even advisable that directors 
who play their monitoring role vis-à-vis management do that in a cooperative manner 
based on a complementarity of knowledge and expertise on both sides (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Ayuso and Argandoña, 2007; Hoskisson et al., 2013). As another 
example, two venture capitalists who invest in the same firm and who may have 
different investment strategies, could meet up on a regular basis outside the board 
room to discuss and agree on a joint investment strategy when it comes to that 
particular firm in their portfolio.  
Context creates governance diversity  
Regarding the context, multiple agency theory does not focus on precise 
agency problems alone, because these may depend on the setting. When referring to 
the influence of the context on corporate governance practices, we refer to both 
country related factors (macro level) as well as organisation related factors (micro 
level). This suggests that corporate governance practices cannot be defined by 
applying a one-size-fits-all approach. In other words, corporate governance practices 
should fit with their macro and micro context in order to be of any value. It implies 
that scholars should combine the traditional agency theory perspective with an 
institutional analysis to build robust assumptions (Ahrens et al., 2011). Indeed, it 
should be noted that each country’s corporate governance norms – in spite of the 
convergence or standardization processes towards a single standard of rules – are 
affected by its social, historical and economic background. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Levine (1997) argue that the legal and political environments have an 
impact on the nature of corporate governance and thereby on corporate governance in 
every country. Fundamental governance factors may vary across countries and, for 
example, the nature of conflicts and their implications may differ from country to 
country (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Similarly, Gabrielsson and Huse (2004: 25) 
state that “documenting and explaining the diversity of governance systems between 
various contexts and organizational settings may then be of help to bring together 
past research findings. That will also help in recognizing problems stemming from 
previous universalistic approaches and general theorizing in research on boards and 
governance.” 
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Different legal traditions (e.g. common and civil law), and levels of economic 
development (macro level), together with different attitudes to rules and regulations 
(both macro and micro level) contribute towards a diversification of corporate 
governance practices (Emmons and Schmid, 1999). This is even truer if we consider 
that the recession has reinforced the importance of national context; some countries 
(e.g. Canada, Australia) have been less affected by the financial crisis through a more 
conservative regulation system (Ahrens et al., 2011). The ability to subscribe 
investment, strategic and financial contracts may depend also on a number of factors 
relating to the institutional environment (Kaplan et al., 2004; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Douma et al., 2006) For this reason, it is difficult to consider a single and dominant 
model (Hung, 1998) of corporate governance, i.e. agency theory. It is necessary to 
take into account the complexity that the context brings in involving multifaceted 
issues (Hung, 1998).  
 
Multiple Approaches and Reconciliation with other Theories 
In order to deeply understand the five key components of MAT, we reconcile 
four corporate theories in response to the call for considering theories and approaches 
complementary rather than opposite (Amaratunga and Baldry, 2001 (Graham & 
Thomas, 2008), Hung, 1998). Particularly, the acknowledgement that the board of 
directors, as an open system, deals with many-to-many relationships (Arthurs et al., 
2008: Hoskinsson et al., 2013), the importance of interactions with the environment 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Walls et al., 2012), the dual identities experience (Pratt 
and Foreman, 2000), the increasing complexity of governance structure and dynamics 
(Ingley et al., 2012; Pugliese et al., 2015), and the dilemmas that the boards has to 
cope with (Dunne, 2000), allows for the possibility of reconciling agency theory with 
other perspectives (Hung, 1998; Zona, 2014; Walker et al., 2015), including 
stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory, stewardship theory and identity 
theory.  
The selection of these four theories is based on their shared epistemological and 
ontological underpinnings (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Crane, Henriques, Husted, & 
Matten, 2016; Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011; Suddaby, 2014). All four theories fit into 
the interpretivism epistemology and can be, from an ontological perspective, 
classified as subjectivist theories. Interpretivism advocates that it is necessary for the 
researcher to understand the differences between humans in their role as social actors. 
Subjectivism argues that social phenomena are created from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of social actors (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
All four theories can be classified into the interpretivism epistemology as they 
seek to describe and understand socially constructed realities. In other words, they 
focus on people rather than objects (Dainty, 2007), by creating socially relative 
knowledge about social phenomena, and by interpreting individuals’ experiences and 
observations (Graham & Thomas, 2008). Applying the four theories necessitates an 
insider perspective on social phenomena and how individuals construct meanings, 
interpret and re-interpret their worlds (Hallebone & Priest, 2009). Sauders et al. 
(2009) state that the challenge of applying this kind of theories is entering the social 
world of research subjects and understand their subjective reality in order to be able to 
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make sense of and understand their motives, actions and intentions (subjectivism). An 
important underlying assumption of interpretivism and subjectivism is that verifiable 
observations (think of the behaviour of independent directors) are potentially subject 
to very different (and thus subjective) interpretations (for example, depending on who 
you are interviewing). In other words, there are various claims for truth and reality.   
1. Stakeholder theory  
Initially, stakeholder theory focused on those groups without whose support 
the company would cease to exist (Freeman, 1984). However, this view has been 
expanded to include any individual or group who can affect or is influenced by the 
firm’s activities (Freeman, 2010; Sternberg, 1997). The pillar of stakeholder theory is 
that companies operate by creating value for which others freely trade. In this view, 
the stakeholder theory provides the theoretical justification to appoint representatives 
of several stakeholders within the board, in order to make sure that all their interests 
are looked after (Hung, 1998). In such a view, the board of directors is responsible to 
a large variety of complementary stakeholders other than just shareholders. Board 
members have also a political role, i.e. they should mediate, negotiate and resolve 
potential conflicts between the interests of all those stakeholders in order to avoid that 
one or several of them act against the firm. Stakeholder theory applies two central 
components of the multiple agency theory: many-to-many relationships (in this case 
between the first and its stakeholders and even between the stakeholders themselves) 
as well as the notion of complementary and cooperative behaviour, which is crucial to 
keep on satisfying the stakeholders.  
2. Resource dependence theory  
This theory is based on the general assumption that resources (i.e. human, 
economic, financial, technological ones) are fundamental for a firm to create its 
competitive advantage (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Ayuso and Argandoña, 
2007). In other words, a firm depends on its internal and external environment for its 
economic success (Pfeffer, 1972; Johnson and Pillai, 2010). Firms may suffer from 
lack or scarcity of resources (Storey, 1994) leading to crises and failure. In this 
respect, a multiple agency approach considers the board of directors and in particular 
those directors who serve on several boards and/or have management positions 
themselves as a direct and indirect source of resources for the firm, often 
complementary to management. Board members, with their knowledge, skills and 
professional experience, may be helpful in providing advice and counselling to 
management in case of limited or lack of inside knowledge. Moreover, board 
members could also provide the firm with access to scarce resources (typically capital 
and knowledge) by providing the firm with access to their networks. In other words, 
directors could act as agents of the external environment (many-to-many 
relationships). This theory shows what complementary and cooperative behaviour 
could mean in a governance context, which is another important element in the 
multiple agency theory.   
3. Stewardship theory  
Stewardship theory states that managers are not prone to self-serving conduct, 
as agency theory puts forward. Hence, their behaviour and actions are aligned with 
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those of shareholders, and this is possible through appropriate incentives and rewards 
(Davis et al., 1997). Managers are considered as good and trustworthy stewards of a 
firm’s assets who do not tend to inappropriate and opportunistic behaviour 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). It recognizes the 
importance of structures that empower the manager-steward and provide autonomy to 
act thanks to a trust based relationship between owners and management (Donaldoson 
and Davis, 1991), and between the board of directors and management.  
Multiple agency theory agrees with a harmonious relationship between the 
board and management (Hung, 1998). The divergence of interests is not that much of 
a problem, because the interests of the board are supposed to be aligned with those of 
management. Moreover, stewardship theory considers the board more as an agent of 
management which is more knowledgeable and powerful in the firm (Hung, 1998). In 
this view, the board of directors does not have a dominant monitoring role to play 
towards management, since management is considered as a trustworthy partner. On 
the contrary, board members play a more strategic role (Cornforth, 2004) along with 
management in order to create added value and achieve corporate objectives which is 
in line with collaborative and cooperative behaviour, a central element in the multiple 
agency theory. They are both supposed to act together in the best interest of the firm. 
However, in the world of business, full trust is often an illusion and, in fact, some 
degree of scepticism is needed.  
4. Identity theory 
 This theory considers individuals as “a collection of identities resulting from 
their multiple roles in society” (Hillman et al., 2008, p. 441). The self is multifaceted 
and reflects the environment in which a person lives. It means that each individual 
may have different behaviours and identities depending on the role s/he plays in a 
particular context. This is consistent with the dual identity concept that is put forward 
by multiple agency theory. Identification is another pivotal issue of the identity theory 
and it represents the importance of identity (Huse et al., 2011). One of the main 
corporate concerns is the identification of the individual as a member of the firm. An 
individual’s participation in a firm or on a board of directors depends on the 
identification they have with certain stakeholders (Huse et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 
2008; Huse and Rindova, 2001).  
Theoretical Illustration: Independent Directors Seen Through a Multiple Agency 
Lens 
The challenge is to move away from the agency theory assumptions 
(Hambrick et al., 2008; Huse et al., 2011) and to shed a different light on the role and 
functioning of independent directors. Indeed, some scholars (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003; Roberts et al., 2005; Huse et al., 2011; Westphal and Zajac, 2013; Armstrong et 
al., 2014) call for a more complex but realistic perspective of independent directors. 
For this reason, we develop propositions for future research by applying the four 
theories discussed in the previous section applied to the five fundaments of multiple 
agency theory, i.e. (1) many-to-many relationships between all kinds of stakeholders; 
(2) dual identities; (3) dilemmas; (4) complementarities and cooperative behaviour; 
and (5) context creating governance diversity.  
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1. Many-to-many relationships and dual identities 
The monitoring relationship between the independent directors and 
management is put forward by agency theory as the most important one (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Thereby, agency theory assumes that independent 
directors have quite a lot of power stemming from the fact that they act on behalf of 
the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Mintzberg, 1983). However, the multiple 
corporate governance failures in the past have shown that the real power of the 
independent directors over management is sometimes very limited or even non-
existent. This is in line with the assumption that the board could just be a legal fiction 
dominated by management (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) and could be a 
creature of the CEO (Mace, 1971) who mainly serves as a rubber-stamping body 
(Herman, 1981). Furthermore, the inherent information asymmetry between 
independents and management (Huse et al., 2011) could be put forward as another 
potential reason for considering independents as a ‘serving body’. This suggests that 
independent directors, despite their valuable knowledge and experience, often play 
only a ceremonial role (Wolfson, 1984; Kosnik, 1987). This represents a missed 
chance for the firm with an important opportunity cost given that independent board 
members are (well) paid without giving much in return. However, it could also be an 
explicit choice of management to populate the board with rather passive independent 
directors. This last option suggests that one of the pillars of the agency theory is 
completely undermined and has not been investigated in detail in the existing 
literature. Future research could try to find out what the added value is of independent 
directors who are only supposed to play a ceremonial role. Resources such as their 
reputation and personal networks could be more important for the firm than their 
knowledge and professional experience, as resource dependence theory claims 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Johnson and Pillai, 2010). It would also be interesting to find out who 
decides in practice on what is expected from the independent directors (management, 
the board, reference shareholders, etc.) and how explicit this is within the board and 
the firm. We posit that it is a matter of expectations management between the firm 
and its independent directors. As long as both parties agree on the ceremonial role of 
the board, and thus all the expectations are respected, this will probably beget no 
tensions within the boardroom. However, in case of a mismatch of expectations this 
could lead to a serious impact on the well-being and behaviour of these independent 
directors. For instance, a new independent director joins the board having the 
intention to play an active role in helping management but discovers after a while that 
this kind of role is not appreciated. This may create a lot of personal frustrations 
leading to dysfunctional behaviour, which may become detrimental for the firm and 
the director him/herself in the longer run. Future research could dig deeper into this 
potential issue of expectations management by focusing on independent directors who 
have left a board on their own initiative or on independent directors whose mandate 
was not renewed or even worse, was ended by the firm before the official end date. 
This leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1a: Having independent directors who only play a ceremonial 
role can be an explicit choice of the firm (management). 
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Proposition 1b: Independent directors who only play a ceremonial role have a 
significant opportunity cost for the firm.  
Proposition 1c: Independent directors who only play a ceremonial role can 
also have an added value for the firm.  
Proposition 1d: The expectations vis-à-vis independent directors are not 
always made explicit.  
It is worth analysing to what extent the resources each independent director 
brings with him/her, influence how s/he is perceived and treated by the other directors 
(resource dependence theory). For instance, older and more experienced directors 
could treat a relatively young independent colleague with less professional experience 
and less knowledge about the firm in a more sceptical way. This may have a negative 
impact on the productivity of the board in the first months/years of his mandate. 
However, if this new young independent director holds an MBA from a prestigious 
university and is a member of a wealthy, well-known family, the perception and 
treatment by his older colleagues could be different leading to different dynamics 
within the board. Future research could find out whether a sort of ‘resource 
competition’ among directors characterizes boards and which resources are most 
important in creating trust and respect amongst directors. Two propositions for future 
research can be derived:  
Proposition 1e: Board effectiveness is significantly influenced by the resource 
competition among the different (independent) directors.  
In addition, the relationships between the independent directors and external 
stakeholders have an important impact on their behaviour, contributions to board 
effectiveness and the way they are perceived internally and externally. These 
relationships create important networks around independent directors (many-to-many 
relationships). These networks are potential sources of all kind of resources for the 
firm, which has been confirmed in previous studies (resource dependence theory). 
However, these multiple relationships and (sometimes) complex networks may also 
create identification problems for the independent directors, which is an unexplored 
topic in the literature so far. Who do they really ‘represent’? Based on the agency 
theory principles, independent directors are supposed to only represent themselves, be 
independent ‘in mind’ and to be shareholders’ agents (Clifford and Evans, 1997; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). However, in practice, it 
could be that their personal direct and indirect connections and affinity with some 
stakeholders of the firm create multiple identities (identity theory) which impede them 
from having a truly independent mind (Deutsch et al., 2011). For instance, a female 
independent director in a Fast Moving Consumer Goods firm, who is also a mother of 
three young children, implicitly feels more affinity with the group of customers to 
which she belongs (families with young children). This specific identification may 
influence how she will react on certain management proposals (for example the 
launch of new products). Her affinity with a specific group of stakeholders can be an 
important resource for the firm as this increases the chance that she will ask 
management the right questions that really challenge management. Nevertheless, the 
risk exists when management proposes strategic actions that specifically involve that 
specific group of stakeholders. In this case, new tensions and conflicts may arise 
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between the woman director and her colleagues who may stigmatize her. This may 
create a board composed of several ‘silos’ (everyone has his/her own area of specialty 
and is supposed to focus on that), which goes against the principle of collegiality.  
On the other hand, it may be important to consider the case of the same young 
mother who is also the founder of a start-up firm that is part of the same value chain, 
president of a service club and member of a family with a strong liberal political 
background. In this case, she will have to manage at least four different identities that 
may influence the way she will react on a management proposal. Is she going to react 
as a young mother, or as an entrepreneur who thinks of opportunities for collaboration 
or mergers in the future, or as the one who is always looking to raise funding for her 
service club, and what if the management proposal goes against the liberal principles 
with which has grown up? How independent in mind is she in this case? Also 
negative self-identity (i.e. ‘This is not who I am’) or resistance to a particular identity 
too can influence actions and behaviour. 
It emerges that directors can be considered as interrelated actors and self-
motivated agents (Ingley and van der Walt, 2004; Laby, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2005) 
because instead of being proper shareholders’ agents, they are likely to take personal 
advantage of and benefit from decisions they have approved (Certo et al. 2008). 
Indeed, they may ‘constitute a unique stakeholder group with their own set of 
interests’ (Certo et al., 2008: 223), ratifying strategic actions which reflect their own 
interests rather than those of shareholders. Therefore, it is important to analyse the 
multiple identities and interactions (Hillman et al., 2008) that board members may 
have, in order to better understand their effects on board practices.  
Existing research ignores these kinds of identity struggles that independent 
directors may be confronted with and these multiple identities may create conflicts of 
interest which can impact on board effectiveness. Future studies on board 
independence could focus on the subject of multiple identities and the potential 
conflicts of interests these may create in order to find out whether board independence 
is an illusion or not. In-depth interviewing of independent directors and/or board 
observations is probably the most appropriate methodology for this. This leads to two 
propositions that could inspire future research:     
Proposition 1f: The existence of multiple identities leading to identity 
struggles is a potential threat for the ‘independence’ of independent directors.  
Proposition 1gh: The existence of multiple identities is a potential threat for 
the collegiality principle within boards.  
2. Dilemmas 
Compared to a technical question a dilemma is, by definition, a question with 
no right or wrong answer which makes it impossible to completely satisfy all parties 
involved. Many board matters fall into this category; one of which could be, the 
strategic choices a firm has to make. For instance, a firm may face a trade-off of two 
opposite strategic plans; namely to continue its incremental growth strategy or to 
radically change its business model. Both options could be successful. Moreover, 
management may be more willing to take risk (Wright et al., 2007) motivated by a 
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potential bonus and therefore prefer the more risky option (in the example, the second 
option). On the other hand, the independent directors, based on their own professional 
experience with similar dilemmas (Hillman et al., 2000; Gul and Leung, 2004) 
(resource dependence theory) and affinity with certain groups of stakeholders 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Hillman et al., 2001; 
Huse, 2003) (stakeholder theory) may be more risk averse (Fernandez and Mazza, 
2014). They may be more risk averse also because the likelihood of being punished 
by the labour market of directors for ineffective governance is high (Hunton and 
Rose, 2008). This makes them more likely to prefer the less risky option. Both 
independents and management are supposed to act in the best interest of the company 
but it is likely that the discussion of both options during the board meeting will be 
difficult and may, in the worst case, create a polarisation between management and 
the independent directors, thereby having a negative impact on the trust between both 
(stewardship theory) . Whatever the financial decision turns out to be, it is going to be 
difficult to satisfy both management and the independent directors. This opens up 
interesting opportunities to advance the board literature. Are directors aware of the 
fact that a lot of their agenda items are in fact real dilemmas and do they treat them in 
the appropriate way, respecting the inherent limitation that there is no right or wrong 
answer? How do they manage the fact that the final decision in a dilemma may not 
satisfy them completely (not be in line with their personal interest)? What is needed in 
terms of group dynamics (think of, for example a set of shared values, practical rules 
for board meetings, the role of the chair) to avoid polarisation within the board 
(Roberts, 2002)? Some propositions for future research can be derived from this 
reflection: 
Proposition 2a: Treating dilemmas as technical questions within the board 
negatively affects board effectiveness.   
Proposition 2b: Different levels of risk appetite between management and the 
independent directors may create polarisation which negatively affects board 
effectiveness.   
3. Complementarities and cooperative behaviour 
There seems to be a consensus in the existing literature (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Roberts, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005; Huse, 2007; Johnson and Pillai, 2010; 
Gabrielsson et al., 2007; Huse et al., 2009) that independent directors are much more 
than just the opponents of management. Independent directors are often 
complementary to management (based on the ‘resources’ they bring with them) and, 
in most cases, behave in a cooperative instead of conflictual way (stewardship 
theory).  
Nevertheless, the literature remains silent on two aspects: (1) the risk that 
cooperative behaviour creates negative group effects; and (2) the real motivation of 
independent directors to behave in a cooperative way (towards management and even 
towards the other directors).  
Boards should behave as a cooperating team in order to fully leverage the 
strengths of each individual board member  (Daily et al., 2003: Huse et al., 2009). 
However, several authors (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; George and George, 1998; 
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Sheldon and Bettencourt, 2002; Bakker and Schaufeli, 2008) have studied the 
phenomenon of negative group behaviour in psychology that may also be applied to 
boards. Issues such as desire to conform to the dominant position of the group which 
results in a lack of creativity, or a resistance to change all stem from the fact that the 
board is in the first place a group of people. These negative effects could outweigh the 
advantages of cooperative behaviour. Future studies could analyse whether directors 
are aware of the potential negative group effects, whether there are clear illustrations 
that group effects have led to suboptimal board behaviour and how boards try to 
manage this (think of the importance of the chair being a strong leader).  
Besides, the real motivation of independent directors to behave in a 
cooperative way may be due to their personal interests. Important personal interests of 
independents are their own reputations and the renewal of their mandates. In 
particular, those independents who have few other sources of income, may be 
strongly driven by these two factors. This may be the main reason why they behave in 
a cooperative way. They tend to avoid conflicts with management and among 
directors in order to protect their own reputation and future mandate(s). Another 
reason for cooperative behaviour and conflict avoidance could be the personal desire 
of independent directors to ‘have fun’ and enjoy their experience as a board member. 
However, there may be periods in which a cooperative attitude towards management 
is not appropriate; for instance, periods in which the company faces serious 
difficulties and whereby management does not seem to take the right actions. In these 
periods, the independents should act in the interests of the company and dare to 
criticize management explicitly and if needed, take drastic decisions such as a CEO 
replacement (crisis management). Instead of continuing to behave in a cooperative 
way, a more conflictual approach may be more appropriate to guarantee the future of 
the company. Sometimes, conflicts can make a difference and are needed to survive 
these difficult periods. In practice, this kind of scenario - where the independents 
choose a conflictual approach - is still very unlikely which puts into question the real 
added value of having independents on board. In case of a firm experiencing positive 
performance and not needing to cope with any special crisis, the independents are 
likely to be less active (Fernando, 2010). The following three propositions can be 
derived:  
Proposition 3a: The negative effects of group behaviour can outweigh the 
advantages of cooperative behaviour and consequently negatively affect board 
effectiveness.  
Proposition 3b: Cooperative behaviour of independent directors can be driven 
by personal interests.  
Proposition 3c: Cooperative behaviour and conflict avoidance within the 
board (and vis-à-vis management) is not always appropriate in crisis periods.  
As far as complementarity within the board and between the board and 
management is concerned, the existing literature on board diversity (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Filatotchev and Toms; 2003; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; Golden and Zajac; 
2001; Nielsen, 2010) shows a consensus that complementarity is one of the 
underlying drivers of board diversity. Boards are composed in a diverse way by 
attracting complementary (independent) directors, mainly in terms of professional 
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experience. A board consisting of complementary directors who each represent one or 
several areas in management (finance, marketing, HR, strategy), can be perceived as a 
mirror of management where exactly the same functional silos can be found. On the 
one hand, the existing literature (Roberts, 2002; Forbes and Milliken, 1999) argues 
that this allows the board to understand what management presents to them which is 
undoubtedly important. On the other hand, is having a board that is almost a copy of 
management in terms of areas of expertise capable of really challenging management? 
Would real diversity not go further than just complementarity of expertise and 
experience? If all these complementary independent directors belong to the same 
generation (meaning that they all grew up and made their careers in the same time 
period which suggests that they have probably all been influenced by the same 
‘events’ in business life, attended the same school/university, are all members of the 
same business club), the chance to look at the reality in a substantially different way 
is low (identity theory). In other words, it is worth investigating to what extent the 
traditional interpretation of diversity in terms of complementarity of expertise and 
experience does not create a kind of diversity illusion. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3d: Real diversity within a board is more than complementarity of 
expertise and experience.   
4. Context  
Every organisation has its unique context including both macro level and 
micro level factors that should be reflected in their corporate governance practices. At 
macro level, the meaning of ‘independence’ varies across different contexts (Aguilera 
and Jackson 2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 
Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005), not only from a legal perspective based on what is 
prescribed by law, but also via what is put forward in the corporate governance codes  
. In addition, sociological and cultural meanings vary across the world. The 
interpretation of independence in developing countries is probably not the same as in 
the U.S.A. and Western Europe (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004; McGee, 2009). 
It follows that when dealing with multinational firms with several nationalities on the 
board, the diversity of meanings of ‘independence’ could become a real challenge as 
not every independent director around the board table has the same reference 
framework (identity theory). Future research on board independence in a 
multinational context could analyse to what extent different sociological and cultural 
meanings of independence are present around the board table and how the board as a 
group deal with this variation region-to-region.  
At micro level, it could be that the degree of activism of the independent 
directors is linked to the life cycle of the firm and/or its products. From this 
perspective, independents are probably more passive during the maturity stage and 
could be more active in the growth stage or when the decline stage is approaching 
(Filatotchev et al. 2006). It could also be that their degree of activism in the different 
stages of the life cycle depends on the resources they bring with them (resource 
dependence theory). In the growth stage of the firm, the independents with a large 
network could play a more important role in the board, as their network and contacts 
maybe leverage the growth of the company. In the maturity stage, when growth is 
rather incremental, the independents with stronger functional expertise may play a 
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more dominant role given the focus on optimisation and efficiency.   Based on this 
reflection, the following propositions for future research are put forward:   
Proposition 4a: Different context related interpretations of independence can 
have an impact on the behaviour of independent directors.  
Proposition 4b: The degree of activism of the independent directors is linked 
to the life cycle of the firm and/or its products.  
Proposition 4c: The degree of activism of the independent directors in the 
different stages of the life cycle of the firm is linked to the resources they bring 
with them. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Our paper responds to calls for a better understanding of board insights and 
potential, and it takes the opportunity to seek to open up the ‘black box’ of dynamics 
and relationships among directors (Daily et al., 2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; 
Filatotchev et al., 2011; Bezemer et al., 2014; Gabrielsson et al., 2014). This is 
achieved by adopting a more holistic view of the board as a group of individuals, and 
moving away from the traditional single agency approach.  
Multiple agency theory is based on a pluralistic approach whereby different 
existing approaches are combined with basic agency theory to better understand and 
explain the complexity of corporate governance. The first aim of this paper was to 
analyse the five fundaments of multiple agency theory which is based on a review of 
the existing literature on multiple agency theory. The first aim of this paper is to 
reconcile four corporate theories in order to better understand the five key fundaments 
of multiple agency theory. The second aim was to illustrate how a comprehensive 
approach which reconciles agency theory with four other theories is able to develop a 
better understanding of the role and functioning of independent directors leading to 
propositions for future research.  Multiple agency theory analyses firm governance in 
its context thereby focusing on the many-to-many relationships that exist between 
actors who often fulfil the role of principal and agent at the same time. Multiple 
agency theory acknowledges the complementarities between actors and accepts that 
both conflicting and cooperative behaviour may exist at the same time. Multiple 
agency theory argues that corporate governance is mainly about principals and agents 
dealing with dilemmas thereby aiming to maintain equilibrium between managers’ 
and stakeholders’ interests. 
In this paper, firstly the five key components of multiple agency theory are 
identified, i.e. many-to-many relationships, dual identities, dilemmas, 
complementarities and cooperative behaviour, and context. Secondly in order to 
develop and better understand a multiple agency approach, four different theories are 
combined together, namelyInstitutional theory, stakeholder theory and resource 
dependency theory belong to the contingency approach; while managerial hegemony, 
stewardship theory, team production theory and identity theory belong to the 
behavioural approach. Finally, we provide a theoretical illustration of independent 
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directors through a multiple agency lens by identifying propositions for future 
research. 
The first area for future research refers to the degree of activism of the 
independent directors. Is it a matter of managing expectations between the 
independents and the rest of the firm? What is the added value of independent 
directors who are only supposed to play a ceremonial role (resource dependence 
theory)?  
A second path for future studies is the dynamics between the different groups 
of directors focusing on the ‘resource competition’ between directors and the link 
with power (resource dependence theory).  
A third unexplored issue are the identification problems for independent 
directors stemming from the multiple relationships and complex networks around 
them. The personal direct and indirect connections and affinities of independents with 
some stakeholders of the firm create multiple identities (identity theory), which may 
impede them from having a truly independent mind. 
A fourth potential research area is the dilemmas a board has to deal with and 
how the inherent nature of a dilemma (no right or wrong answer) may create a trust 
breach between the board and management (stewardship theory).  
A fifth interesting topic is the negative effects that may stem from cooperative 
behaviour within the board and between the board and management (stewardship 
theory). Related to this, the influence of personal interests of independents such as the 
protection of their reputation and the renewal of their mandates on their behaviour 
also merits in-depth research.  
A sixth area refers to an alternative approach to the study of board diversity, 
thereby, abandoning the existing paradigm that board diversity is mainly inspired by 
complementarity (between board members as well as between the board and 
management) (resource dependency theory). 
Finally, taking account the context at both macro (for example, different 
nationalities having different interpretations of the meaning of ‘independence’) and 
micro (for example, the impact of the life cycle of the organisation) level  is also 
worth investigating (identy theory and resources based theory). 
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